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Preventive Restructuring Frameworks: A Possible Solution for 
Financially Distressed Multinational Corporate Groups in the EU 
 
 




The difficulties of the effective rescue of multinational corporate groups (MCGs) in the EU 
have long been recognized. The limitations of the existing MCG rescue solutions, including 
substantive consolidation, procedural consolidation and procedural cooperation, mean that 
there is no panacea for preserving the value of financially distressed MCGs for creditors. It 
seems that a possible way to preserve the value of the MCGs worth rescuing is to avoid their 
free-fall insolvency at an early stage. In practice, many pan-EU groups decide to use English 
schemes of arrangement to stave off group-wide insolvency. This phenomenon corresponds to 
the recent European Commission’s proposal for a Directive on preventive restructuring 
frameworks (PRFs) which aims to provide Member States with a minimum harmonization of 
restructuring tools to rescue financially distressed companies and to avoid their insolvency. Also, 
the new EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings has expended its scope to incorporate 
preventive restructuring procedures. This article will explore how preventive restructuring 
frameworks can work as a supplementary solution to preserve value for MCGs and examine 
whether this may improve the undesirable status quo.  
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In the Europe 2020 Strategy for Jobs and Growth, the European Commission has set as 
current political priorities promoting economic recovery and sustainable growth, a higher 
investment rate and preservation of employment; as part of the strategies to achieve the above 
goals, the reform of insolvency law and adaptation of the rescue culture are believed to be 
useful in facilitating economic recovery.1 
 As a response, at the EU level, the European Commission issued the ‘Restructuring 
Recommendation on preventive restructuring frameworks (PRFs)’ in 2014. 2  Due to the 
concern that some Member States may not take actions properly,3 on 22 November 2016, the 
European Commission further proposed a Directive on PRFs with the aim to help distressed 
companies with their debt restructurings in the EU and to avoid the stigma of insolvency.4 In 
addition, the scope of the new EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings (EIR recast)5 is 
expanded so that it encompasses, to a large extent, the rescue-focused (pre-insolvency or hybrid) 
proceedings of Member States.6 
 The aim of this article is to examine whether the proposed PRFs may, together with EIR 
recast, add an extra valuable tool to the solutions for multinational corporate group (MCG) 
rescue in the EU. It first introduces the difficulties of MCG rescue by considering obstacles 
arising from the goals of corporate rescue law, the organizational form of MCGs and the cross-
border nature of MCG insolvency. It examines why substantive consolidation and procedural 
consolidation may not always be a solution. Secondly, it examines the main functions of the 
proposed preventive restructuring procedures and exemplifies their usefulness by providing two 
types of restructuring cases featuring English schemes of arrangement. Thirdly, it evaluates the 
nature of PRFs as to whether they are insolvency proceedings and the relationship between 
PRFs and EIR recast. It also briefly considers the possibility for PRFs and EIR group 
coordination proceedings to work together for MCG rescue. Lastly, the article also points out 
the benefits of including PRFs in the scope of EIR recast. The article concludes that PRFs are 
a welcome development in the right direction with improved ability to avoid MCG insolvency 
and may therefore provide a better debt recovery rate for creditors. 
 
 
                                                             
1 Commission Staff Working Document, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, Accompanying the 
document Commission Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, SWD(2014) 62 
final, p 2. 
2  European Commission, Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and 
insolvency, C(2014) 1500 final. 
3 McCormack (2017), p 201. 
4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM(2016) 723 final; Yeowart (2009), p 518. 
5  Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L 141/19-72 (hereinafter: EIR recast). 
6 EIR recast, Art. 1. 
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2 The difficulties of MCG rescue in the EU 
 
2.1 Introduction of MCGs 
 
It has long been recognized that businesses can be operated at cross-border level through 
various organizational forms including companies, partnerships and non-equity-based 
organizations such as franchise agreements.7 Amongst all these forms, a prevalent form to run 
business transnationally, especially for large companies,8 is multinational corporate groups 
(MCGs) consisting of limited liability companies.9 MCGs are different from pure domestic 
corporate groups as they have no clear nationalities. Each member company may incorporate 
in a different country and obtain its nationality under company law.10 
 What makes the relationship among member companies in MCGs and the ordinary arm’s-
length market relationship different is the ‘controlled internal environment’ of MCGs, either by 
ownership or by contracts.11 That is to say, MCGs internalize some business activities which 
otherwise may need to be obtained from the market by ownership or contracts.12 
 Ownership is a typical way for parent companies to exert control on subsidiaries by direct 
or indirect shareholdings. Under the company law of many Member States, once a parent 
company holds more than 51% shares of its subsidiaries, it can establish control over them by 
ownership.13 Sometimes, de jure control can be established by cross-holding whereby three 
companies mutually hold a certain amount of each other’s shares and agree to operate in a 
uniform way14 or by a chain-type structure which allows the parent company situated at the top 
of the group structure to control the subsidiaries far down the hierarchy of the group.15 
 Another way to establish control is by means of contracts. For example, member companies 
can be connected by distribution agreements where distributors may enjoy exclusive rights to 
sell the products of other companies.16 Similarly, member companies may also enter into 
production agreements whereby the production of certain products is carried out in host 
countries.17 
 MCGs have the capability of distributing resources across borders, taking advantage of 
local resources and coordinating the activities of members by exerting control.18 According to 
an economic definition, MCGs generally refer to multinational corporate groups whose 
transnational businesses in two or more states in the EU are controlled and coordinated.  
                                                             
7 Mevorach (2009), p 20. 
8 Mevorach (2005), p 4. 
9 Teichmann (2015), p 203. 
10 Blumberg (1993), p 173. 
11 Ho (2012), p 886; Rajak (2009), p 530. 
12 See Sect. 2.3 for more details. 
13 Hopt (2015), p 2. 
14 Prentice (1998-1999), p 313. 
15 Ibid., p 313. 
16 Muchlinski (2007), p 53. 
17 Ibid., p 54. 
18 Ibid., p 8. 
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 Besides the economic definition, it would be very helpful to examine the legal definition 
of MCGs at the beginning, especially for insolvency law. It should be noted that even though 
MCGs are the prevalent form of doing business in a cross-border context, specific legal regimes 
to deal with corporate groups are rare.19 MCGs in many areas of law are not treated as a whole 
entity, but as a group of individual companies. In certain areas of law, such as accounting and 
tax,20 one MCG has been treated as an economically integrated organization.  
 To provide a legal definition of MCGs, control may be used to draw the border of a group 
of companies.21 The control exerted by parent companies is sometimes reflected by their share 
ownership in subsidiaries or their power to determine who the board members of subsidiaries 
are.22 Some legislation also recognizes the contractual control; one example is EU competition 
law.23 
 In the area of cross-border insolvency law, the newly released EU Regulation on insolvency 
proceedings recast (EIR recast) provides a definition of groups of companies by using control 
as a benchmark. Its definition is as follows: 
 
(13) ‘group of companies’ means a parent undertaking and all its subsidiary 
undertakings; (14) ‘parent undertaking’ means an undertaking which controls, 
either directly or indirectly, one or more subsidiary undertakings. An undertaking 
which prepares consolidated financial statements in accordance with Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) shall be deemed to 
be a parent undertaking.24 
 
From the EIR recast, one can notice that control, irrespective of deriving from ownership or 
contracts, is the main method to define MCGs in legal terms. In this article, MCGs may be 
defined as a group of companies operating in more than one Member State, cooperating and 
coordinating with each other to run businesses by means of control established by equity 
                                                             
19 De Vette (2011), p 216. 
20 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law—Part three, p 14; in the area of accounting, see Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, 
consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC [2013] OJ L 182/19-76, Art. 2 (9-13); see Art. 3 of Directive 2006/43/EC [2006] OJ L 157/87-107. In 
tax areas, the corporate groups are allowed to benefit from group relief provisions so as to reduce the tax burden. 
The main idea of such a mechanism is to allow corporation tax loss members (surrendering companies) to transfer 
such losses to profit-making members (claimant companies) so as to set off the tax liabilities of the latter. 
Muchlinski (2007), p 265. 
21 UK Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 1159(1); UK Corporation Tax Act 2010, Art. 152 on groups of companies; 
OECD Tax Model, Art. 9. 
22 Blumberg (1990), p 329.  
23  Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1-22, Art. 3(2)(b) ‘[m]eans which […] confer the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by: […] (b) rights or contracts which 
confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.’ 
24 EIR recast, Art. 2. 
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holding or contracts. Even though there is no perfect definition of MCGs, the control test 
generally provides an acceptable definition. More importantly, in some cases, control indicates 
a degree of business cooperation and coordination in a given group. Insolvency law may want 
to preserve the complex and delicate relationships to preserve the value of distressed MCGs for 
creditors in general.25 
 MCGs reportedly generate 30 percent of jobs and 41 percent of gross added value in the 
EU, and their insolvency has a far-reaching impact on the European economy.26 The impact 
may be contagious as cross-border businesses mainly operate through a network of 
subsidiaries27 and the financial difficulties of one member company may be passed on to 
others.28 Given the significance of MCGs to the EU economy, this article chooses MCGs as a 
research target and evaluates whether the European Commission’s newly proposed Directive 
for preventive restructuring frameworks is a step in the right direction. 
 Designing reliable rescue solutions for MCGs should at least take into account three main 
issues: the purposes of corporate rescue law, the organizational form of MCGs, and the cross-
border nature of MCG insolvency. These three features will be briefly examined in turn below. 
 
2.2 The Purpose of Preventive Restructuring Proceedings 
 
To understand the new rescue culture in the EU, it is very helpful to examine the purposes of 
insolvency law and corporate rescue law. Traditionally, liquidation proceedings are typical 
insolvency law proceedings which replace creditors’ individual actions by a collective 
insolvency law solution to maximize creditors’ recovery from indebted debtors 29and screen 
out insolvent companies with unworkable business plans from the market.30 That is to say that 
at the micro level, the goal of insolvency law is to protect creditors by maximizing their 
recovery; at the macro level, an effective insolvency law also helps lower the borrowing interest 
rates and incentivize investment, and therefore encourages economic growth. 
 However, in many cases, the value of businesses cannot be fully realized in the market by 
a break-up sale in liquidation proceedings due to market failures;31 it is here that corporate 
rescue law can play a role by preserving businesses as going concerns.32 Distressed companies 
with going-concern value are generally named as financially distressed companies which are 
worth saving mainly through readjusting capital structures. 33  Corporate rescue law either 
facilitates creditors and debtors to reach a new deal on the capital structure of the distressed 
companies, or to sell businesses as a whole in a pre-packed sale to a third party who can 
                                                             
25 See Sect. 2.2 for more details. 
26  Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the Document Commission 
Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, SWD(2014) 61 final p 20. 
27 Ibid., p 20. 
28 Ibid., p 2. 
29 Jackson (1986), p 10; Janger (2001), p 566; Mooney Jr. (2004), p 946. 
30 Jackson and Skeel Jr. (2013), p 2. 
31 Market failures may include a lack of buyers, or competition may make such a sale approach less attractive. 
32 Going-concern value, as a key accounting concept, refers to a business that will continue to operate in the future. 
33 Eidenmüller (2017), p 274. 
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appreciate the going-concern value of the businesses.34  
 Traditionally, corporate rescue law refers to insolvency proceedings which focus on rescue 
rather than liquidation. To initiate such proceedings, an insolvency test generally needs to be 
met.35 The problem is that sometimes it will be too late to rescue the businesses if debtors 
cannot resort to restructuring tools until the companies are insolvent. Therefore, so-called pre-
insolvency proceedings or preventive restructuring proceedings are designed and their aim is to 
avoid insolvency by encouraging debtors to seek financial support or take relevant actions 
before insolvency.36 Different to pure private workouts, pre-insolvency procedures are judicial 
proceedings with court involvement.37 By avoiding insolvency, the goodwill or important 
licences of distressed companies may be protected.38 In the case of MCG insolvency, it may 
help to avoid group-wide insolvency by subjecting one or more companies to preventive 
restructuring procedures. Also, preventive restructuring procedures only demand minimum 
court involvement and may be cheaper than formal reorganization proceedings.39 
 What preventive restructuring law and traditional corporate rescue have in common is that 
their ultimate purpose points to creditor protection. The initiation of preventive restructuring 
proceedings is generally triggered by debtors’ foreseeable financial distress, so PRFs also need 
to deal with collective issues of creditors.40 Therefore, the purposes of PRFs and corporate 
rescue procedures are not essentially different. They all aim to protect creditors by respecting 
their respective rights41 and preserving debtors’ value for distribution.42  
 
2.3 Difficulties Arising from the Organizational Forms of MCGs 
 
When it comes to the MCG rescue setting, one may ask two relevant questions. The first is 
whether going-concern value may exist in MCGs so that they deserve special treatment in 
corporate rescue law. Another question is whether MCGs can be treated as one company for the 
purpose of corporate rescue law. 
 The answer to the first question seems to be affirmative. According to resource-based 
theory, a company needs to obtain certain resources that are rare and idiosyncratic so as to 
achieve success in the market.43 Such resources can be the relationships that the company has 
formed with its suppliers and customers.44 For a company, its business partners may well be 
other member companies in the same group. Because of these relationships, the distress of one 
company may well be felt by parties linked with this company, and legislators have long been 
                                                             
34 Baird (1998-1999), p 577. 
35 Cash flow test and balance sheet test. See McCormack (2017), p 180. 
36 Wessels and Madaus (2017), p 183. 
37 Wessels and Madaus (2017), p 175. 
38 Davis et al. (2016), p 22. 
39 Kastrinou and Jacobs (2016), pp 91-92. 
40 Tollenaar (2017), p 74. 
41 Schwartz (2005), p 1220. 
42 See generally Schwartz (2005) and Rotem (2008).  
43 Barney (1991), pp 99-120; Conner (1996), pp 477-501. 
44 Wheeler et al. (2003), p 3. 
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aware of this effect on the wider world.45  
 The knowledge-based theory46 further argues that the capability of a given company to use 
knowledge and to transfer and coordinate different knowledge is also an important resource.47 
The possession of rare resources and the capabilities to use the resources together allow one 
company to be more efficient than others as that company can use its assets in the most 
productive way.48 Besides other resources, the knowledge possessed by groups of companies 
is invaluable and the key for groups of companies is to transfer and coordinate the knowledge 
to produce advantages.49 
 Companies which do not possess rare resources or the capabilities to use them will not be 
able to win from competitors which can use them to produce more profits in the market.50 As 
a result, these companies may suffer negative cash flows and become insolvent in the future. 
Due to the rare resources and capabilities, the additional value that a company can gain can be 
considered as the going concern value of that company.51  
 Internalization theory 52  explains the organizational form of MCGs and provides that 
MCGs may choose to internalize certain activities to reduce transaction costs in arm’s-length 
transactions in the market. In other words, the imperfection of markets causes MCGs to locate 
some of the business activities inside a group whereby the transaction costs can be reduced.53 
Transaction costs deriving from unbounded rationality 54  and opportunism 55  make the 
contracts of knowledge transfer costly.56 MCGs will expand their business to other countries if 
they can gain more net benefits from managing the interdependent subsidiaries’ relationships 
than they can in the domestic market.57 Therefore, internalization theory and resource-based 
theory together indicate that it is possible for certain MCGs to have the group going-concern 
value among their relationships58 which should be preserved for the purpose of corporate 
rescue law. 
 The answer to the second question is likely to be negative. It is well-established that a 
company has independent legal status; the limited liability and legal personality are core 
features of companies which generate economic efficiency by lowering the costs of doing 
business. 59  For instance, by enabling companies to own properties, shares can easily be 
transferred from sellers to buyers without costs arising from the transfer of business; limited 
                                                             
45 Dahlin et al. (2005), p 5. 
46 Grant (1996), pp 109-122. 
47 Kogut and Zander (1993), p 625. 
48 Makadok (2001), pp 387–401; Rasmussen and Skeel Jr. (1995), p 86. 
49 Grant (1996), p 120. 
50 White (1994), p 1319. 
51 Harner (2015), p 512. 
52 Rugman (2009); Buckley and Strange (2011).  
53 Galanis (2011), p 331; see also Coase (1937), pp 386–405. 
54 The difficulty of absorbing and understanding complicated information. 
55 The contractual parties may pursue self-interest. 
56 Rugman (1986), p 109. 
57 Hennart (2009), p 133. 
58 Dyer and Singh (1998), p 661; Gulati et al. (2000), p 207. 
59 Mevorach (2009), p 41. 
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liabilities of investors also encourage businessmen to engage in their business activities.60 
 As opposed to a single company, an MCG encompasses more than one company in the 
same group. The doctrine of substantive consolidation sees an MCG as one single company in 
an insolvency context and aims to distribute the total assets of the group to all the creditors 
under one set of rules.61  
 The benefits of substantive consolidation exist mainly in two types of cases. A typical 
scenario in the first group is that the debtor group is functioning as one entity, and it is in line 
with creditors’ expectations at the time of making lending decisions to treat a group of 
companies as one entity; such practice will provide a quick solution to the given cases.62 
Another type of cases is that the assets and liabilities of the debtor group are messily entangled 
together and very costly to untie; therefore, it is in the interest of creditors to treat the group as 
one entity.63 
 However, in practice, substantive consolidation is only applied in extreme cases, including 
situations where one subsidiary’s veil needs to be lifted or where assets of one corporate group 
are tightly intertwined which makes it costly to divide them into respective companies.64  
 The UK court may show reluctance to apply substantive consolidation. In a UK case, Re 
Polly Peck International plc,65 where the administrator requested substantive consolidation, 
and the UK court denied the argument that one Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) subsidiary is just 
the façade of the given company and thereby should be substantively consolidated. The UK 
court insisted that using SPVs solely for the purpose of finance is common practice, even if 
creditors are harmed by group structures.66 There is no necessity to transplant the concept of 
substantive consolidation to UK case law.67 
 In Europe, such a concept may be subject to different interpretations by various Member 
States and it could therefore be difficult to reach consensus regarding its use. Also, substantive 
consolidating companies located in different Member States into one country will dramatically 
change the applicable insolvency law, which may not be expected by the local creditors.68 The 
best example is the different priority rankings of creditors in different Member States’ 
insolvency laws. One creditor may be in the top ranking under local insolvency law, while he 
may be demoted to a second or even lower ranking under another country’s insolvency law. The 
size of each debtor’s assets is also different, so the result of substantive consolidation will 
benefit some general creditors at the expense of others. 
 One may argue that MCG insolvency cases may not necessarily belong in the category of 
the above extreme cases. Substantive consolidation frequently means that all creditors from 
different companies in a given group will be subjected to one set of insolvency rules; as opposed 
to the insolvency rules of creditors’ home countries, this set of rules may not be expected by 
                                                             
60 Ibid., p 41. 
61 Graulich (2006), p 527. 
62 In re Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 BR 563, 573 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993). 
63 Union Saving Bank v. Augie/Restivo Banking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Banking Co.) 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988). 
64 Baird (2005-2006), p 21. 
65 Polly Peck International Plc (In Administration) (No. 4), Re [1996] 1 BCLC 428. 
66 Bowmer (2000), p 196. 
67 Ibid., p 196. 
68 Van Galen (2012), p 32. 
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some creditors. Moreover, different companies may have various debt/asset rates and it will 
destroy creditors’ expectations if all the debts and assets of different companies are pooled 
together. Substantive consolidation may violate the requirement of respecting the non-
insolvency law principle as mentioned above. 
 
2.4 Difficulties Arising from the Cross-Border Nature of MCG Insolvency  
 
Another difficulty of MCG rescue is that the insolvency laws of Member States are different. 
Their insolvency laws may focus on varying policies, such as employment protection and debt 
collection.69 For instance, the statutory priority of creditors is the manifestation of the hierarchy 
of values and policies of Member States. 70  Therefore, it would be almost impossible to 
reconcile many parallel insolvency proceedings of member companies in the same MCG. 
 Having said that, whether an MCG insolvency can be administered in only one court under 
one set of insolvency rules depends on the rules of international insolvency jurisdiction. The 
current EU legislation that determines international insolvency jurisdiction for a company is 
the EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings recast, which provides that the insolvency 
jurisdiction of a company should be allocated to the Member State where the company is 
registered; the registered place is a rebuttable presumption.71 Where evidence can show that its 
centre of main interest (CoMI) is located in a different Member State, the latter Member State 
should enjoy the insolvency jurisdiction of that company.72 The CoMI is defined as the place 
where the head office functions of one company are carried out in a non-transient way and 
ascertainable to third parties. 73  More importantly, the CoMI is applied to an individual 
company rather than to an entire MCG.74 
 When it comes to the MCG insolvency setting, it is possible that member companies are 
subject to different insolvency jurisdictions as their registration places or CoMIs are not 
necessarily located in the same Member State. Two methods are proposed to solve the problem: 
procedural consolidation and procedural cooperation.  
 Procedural consolidation, focusing on insolvency jurisdiction rules, aims to allocate the 
insolvency proceedings of group members to one court or to as small a number of courts as 
possible so as to facilitate the administration of multiple insolvency proceedings of a group-
wide insolvency case.75 However, under the definition of CoMI, it is entirely possible that the 
insolvency jurisdictions of member companies are not in the same country, which indicates a 
serious limitation of procedural consolidation.  
 One may choose to design a concept called ‘group CoMI’ to centrally control the 
insolvency proceedings and to maximize the recovery of corporate group insolvency for 
creditors. 76  The group CoMI concept can be defined as the location where the group 
                                                             
69 Eidenmüller (2016), p 10. 
70 Garrido (2010-2011), p 474. 
71 EIR recast, Art. 3(1) International jurisdiction. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-3813; Case C-396/09, Interedil [2011] ECR I-9915. 
74 Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-3813 
75 Mevorach (2009), p 131. 
76 Bufford (2012), p 712. 
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collectively organizes and manages its interests and is perceptible to third parties.77 It points to 
the place where the head office function of an MCG is centrally carried out and controlled.78 
 Such a concept helps centralize insolvency proceedings in one place, especially in terms of 
types of corporate groups which are business-integrated and centrally controlled by one parent 
company.79 The group CoMI will reduce the cost of multiple insolvency proceedings and avoid 
the difficulty of court-to-court cooperation. The danger is that the group CoMI approach is equal 
to putting all eggs in one basket since a change of location of the group CoMI will cause a 
change of applicable law for all creditors in the group, which will dramatically affect their 
interests. Another problem is that, in practice, the CoMI may not be easily determined as the 
management teams and assets may be evenly spread among some countries. As a result, the 
rules of priority of certain local creditors may be replaced by completely different foreign rules 
of priority,80 making the local courts reluctant to defer to foreign courts.81 
 Compared to procedural coordination, procedural cooperation is modest and aims to 
facilitate cooperation and coordination between courts and insolvency practitioners of different 
Member States. However, it may be too late to rescue an MCG when a group of companies falls 
into insolvent status; creditors of the group gain significant leverage on different member 
companies in the group, and multiple insolvency proceedings will tear the group business apart 
and drain away going-concern value of the group. Even though some debtors and creditors 
would like to cooperate with each other, differences in national insolvency laws may prevent 
them from doing so.  
 Since all these theoretical solutions may have serious limitations as regards resolving the 
rescue issue of MCGs when a group-wide insolvency has taken place, one may argue that a 
possible way to preserve the group value is to avoid group-wide insolvency through certain 
preventive restructuring procedures. The next section will examine preventive restructuring 
procedures in more detail. 
 
3 The Characteristics of Preventive Restructuring Procedures  
 
On 22 November 2016, the European Commission proposed a Directive on PRFs with the aim 
of helping distressed companies in the EU with their debt restructurings and avoiding the stigma 
of insolvency. 82  According to the proposal, the UK schemes of arrangement and the US 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code are the models on which the PRFs may be based.83 The word 
‘preventive’ seems to reflect that the current corporate rescue culture has shifted from focusing 
on post-insolvency to pre-insolvency rescue.84 This section will examine the main functions of 
                                                             
77 Bufford (2012), p 716; Janger (2009-2010), p 434. 
78 Mevorach (2009), p 8. 
79 Mevorach (2009), p 8. 
80 Kipnis (2007-2008), p 175. 
81 Tung (2001-2002), pp 47-49. 
82 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the council on preventive restructuring, insolvency 
and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM(2016) 723 final; Yeowart (2009), p 518. 
83 Tollenaar (2017), p 66. 
84 Finch (2008), pp 756-757. 
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PRFs and provide MCG rescue examples by using PRFs. 
 
3.1 Introduction of Preventive Restructuring Frameworks 
 
According to the European Commission’s Recommendation, the suggested preventive 
restructuring frameworks contain mainly six functions: early warning, debtor-in-possession, 
minimum court involvement, stay, cross-class cram-down, and refinancing. 85  Also, these 
elements are elaborated in the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive with more 
details. 
 Early warning, debtor-in-possession (DIP) and minimum court involvement together 
reflect that it is important to avoid insolvency by taking restructuring actions at an early stage. 
This is especially true of MCG rescue cases, as it is extremely difficult to coordinate multiple 
insolvency proceedings opened in different Member States.  
 Various legal instruments may be used as early warning tools to monitor the health of 
companies, such as debtors’ accounting and monitoring duties under company and tax law and 
reporting duties imposed by loan contracts.86 The early warning test, which varies in different 
Member States, invariably reveals that the debtor will be in the vicinity of insolvency soon if 
no actions are taken.87 In the context of MCG rescue, whether pre-insolvency proceedings can 
be opened depends on each Member State’s insolvency test and early warning test. Where not 
all member companies are insolvent or qualify for preventive proceedings, the healthy members 
may not be able to enter insolvency. However, the initiation of pre-insolvency proceedings of 
some key member companies can send a strong signal to other group members as to whether 
the latter need to prepare for financial distress or provide certain support and cooperation.  
 The right to open pre-insolvency proceedings in the EU lies almost exclusively with the 
debtor in the EU, as the latter possesses the most up-to-date information about a company’s 
financial condition.88 A PRF is expected in the form of the US Chapter 11 DIP regime as it 
could provide necessary incentives for the managers to make use of the PRF and consider rescue 
plans at an early stage.89 It has also been recognized that DIP creates the least interruption in 
the business operation and it is likely to preserve the value of the whole business, compared to 
manager-replacing regimes.90 The reason is that courts and administrators are not experts in 
running businesses; courts may have difficulties in making business judgments about 
approaches to rescuing the business and the best way to achieve the rescue purposes. 91 
However, such early actions cannot be taken without any check and balance. The European 
Commission requires companies which want to initiate the PRF to be, at least, in the likelihood 
of insolvency92 with the aim to prevent debtors from forcing creditors to accept unfair terms of 
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rescue plans without any justifiable reasons.93 
 The next task for a PRF is to organize the renegotiation process and cure the unworkable 
capital structure of a financially distressed company. Arguably, to make a debt restructuring 
plan workable, stay, cram-down and refinancing are three useful tools.94  
 Refinancing tools are important components to a workable PRF, as in many cases fresh 
money needs to be provided95 in addition to debt waivers or debt-for-equity swaps; the goal is 
to resolve the debt-overhang issue.96 Debt-overhang issues occur where the indebted company 
cannot borrow money to get rid of distress and invest in profitable opportunities for fear of the 
possibility that most of the surplus gained will be reaped by existing creditors.97 As a result, 
protection and encouragement should be provided to refinancers. 
 In many MCG restructuring cases the function of stay has been largely substituted by either 
inter-creditor agreements between senior creditors where those creditors have reached a 
standstill agreement, or by market devices such as claim trading. If some creditors are not 
interested in the reorganization, they may simply choose to sell their debts instead of taking any 
actions.98 
 However, due to the fragmented debts and varying categories of creditors, it can be 
expected that creditors may have different incentives or views and take individual actions to 
make companies enter into the status of insolvency; such a move could activate the creditor 
default swap provision, which provides a better compensation for their debts.99 It is also 
possible that certain creditors have no incentive to timely reach a new agreement, because they 
may buy debts at a very low cost from the market, such that they can bear the cost of delay.100 
Without a stay mechanism, they are under no pressure to enter into any renegotiation with the 
debtors.101 Nonetheless, in MCG cases, since most of the debt restructurings are conducted in 
the holding levels for the purpose of mitigating the disturbance to operating subsidiaries, the 
stay may mostly affect holding companies.102 If senior creditors have sophisticated contracts 
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in place to collectively regulate their actions, it is plausible that stay is not urgently required, 
especially in MCG rescue cases. 
 Cram-down is a typical insolvency law tool which is used to resolve anti-commons issues 
where every party has veto power to stop other parties from using resources, giving rise to 
underuse of the resources.103 The rationale of cram-down is that creditors do not need to reach 
unanimous consensus for the reorganization plan to be approved. Stay is employed to resolve 
the classic common-pool issues where a group of people are competing for inadequate debtors’ 
resources.104  
 Now that the main functions of PRFs have been examined, the next section will take 
English schemes of arrangement as an example for further analysis. The creditor schemes refer 
to the schemes of arrangement that are used in corporate restructuring settings, as opposed to 
other usages. 
 
3.2 Creditor Scheme of Arrangement as a Procedure in PRFs 
 
It is believed that the English scheme of arrangement is a typical PRF, 105  as it bears a 
resemblance to the features that a PRF may have; and more importantly, having been used by 
many foreign MCGs to avoid insolvency, the creditor scheme has proven its effectiveness in 
achieving the goal that the European Commission wishes to reach. Whether creditor schemes 
of arrangement should be categorized as a preventive restructuring procedure is subject to 
debate. What matters here is how a scheme of arrangement, with the functions that the 
Recommendation and Directive proposed, can avoid MCG insolvency. This section will 
examine the main functions of schemes of arrangement and provide some cases to illustrate 
their usefulness. 
 English schemes of arrangement are regulated by Company Act 2006 section 895.106 In 
essence, schemes of arrangement could be considered as a compromise between a company and 
its creditors or members. In other words, schemes of arrangement aim to provide a basic 
framework for companies, creditors or shareholders to renegotiate plans flexibly if certain 
requirements have been met. A sufficient connection between a foreign company and England 
is a jurisdictional standard for using schemes. As long as the loan contracts between debtors 
and creditors are subject to English law, either including English courts’ exclusive jurisdiction 
clause or not, this sufficient connection test is met.107  
 In typical creditors’ schemes, the purpose is usually to restructure the capital structure of 
distressed companies. It is rare that creditors will agree on debt restructurings by schemes if the 
companies have no financial difficulties.108 This enhances the appetite of foreign countries as 
they can restructure their debt at an earlier stage than in their home countries. Schemes also 
include cram-down power so that as long as a majority number (75 percent of value) of creditors 
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in each class support a plan, the dissident creditors are bound by the terms.109 There are mainly 
three stages for a scheme to come into effect.110 Firstly, a company needs to notify the courts 
that a meeting will be convened; then creditors need to vote on the plan and each class needs to 
approve it. The ensuing stage is for the court to sanction the plan.111 
 The creditor scheme, corresponding to the proposal of the European Commission, is a DIP 
procedure which causes the least interruption to the directors in the distressed companies in the 
course of the debt restructuring, as their positions are preserved. Also, it provides a good 
incentive to directors encouraging them to initiate the restructuring at an early stage, for the 
same reason. 112  Evidence of EU Member States’ rescue law also shows that DIP may 
effectively contribute to the efficiency of pre-insolvency law, which, in turn, contributes to 
reducing the non-performing loan in a banking system, deleveraging corporate debts and 
stimulating economic growth.113 
 Similar to US Chapter 11, English schemes do not condition their usage on insolvency. 
However, the use of schemes generally heralds that the companies will be in financial 
difficulties very soon. The early intervention capacity provides a good opportunity for creditors 
and companies to reach a sustainable deal. Without the capacity to impact the unworkable debt 
contracts, the creditors may have to wait for default, during which time the value of the 
companies may significantly decrease.114 
 It is worth noting that the Directive suggests that the PRFs may not necessarily consist of 
only one procedure. Therefore, there may be some variations with reference to the functions 
that one specific PRF contains. Also, in different cases, the significance of one function may be 
much greater than others. One example is that the English schemes of arrangement work very 
well in many cases without the stay mechanism,115 but where necessary, schemes could be used 
along with insolvency proceedings such as administration to gain such a function.116  
 There is no doubt that the cram-down mechanism is a very powerful tool for schemes of 
arrangement, especially because it can also bind senior creditors prior to insolvency. Some 
countries have no PRFs with cram-down tools in the pre-insolvency stage, so it is difficult for 
the creditors to organize themselves so as to avoid insolvency. 117  Claim trading and 
participation of various categories of financial investors in the debt market make a cram-down 
mechanism more important than it was before. Restructuring and insolvency practice is fraught 
with dynamic activities and changes so that creditors have varying views regarding the value 
of the business and how to preserve their own value; even though there is one moment when 
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all the creditors can reach a consensus, a few hours later some may change their minds.118 It is 
possible that creditors vying for control exacerbate the hold-out issue. Certain creditors may 
have their own agenda regarding how to restructure the debtors’ business while their plan may 
work against the interest of the creditors in general. This undesirable situation has to be solved 
by cram-down tools provided by the PRFs. 
 As mentioned above, in an MCG rescue setting, financial creditors are generally organized 
by an inter-creditor agreement where the senior creditors make the most important decisions. 
Cram-down mechanisms in many cases are used to facilitate senior creditors to reach 
agreements regarding how the MCGs should be rescued and refinanced and how the loss should 
be allocated. One important goal is to allow businesses to be sold clear of secured rights and 
guarantees as otherwise considerable transaction costs will be incurred if every transaction is 
dealt with separately or is strategically blocked by uncooperative creditors.119  
 In some cases, cross-class cram-down120 is required. Schemes, unlike US Chapter 11, do 
not allow cross-class cram-down. That is to say, unless all the classes of creditors approve a 
reorganization plan, the scheme cannot be sanctioned by the courts. However, twinning 
schemes with administration procedures allow the business to be sold to the buyers under 
administrators’ power, as long as the affected creditors have agreed. As the dissident classes of 
creditors are out-of-money creditors in such a situation, their approval is not sought by the 
debtor. Therefore, schemes can achieve the proposed useful cross-class cram-down.121  
 
3.3 Examples of MCG Rescue via PRFs 
 
In Sect. 1 of this article, it has been argued that it is difficult to preserve the going-concern value 
of MCGs due to the organizational form of MCGs and differences between national insolvency 
laws. The special organizational form of MCGs makes it impossible to consider a group as one 
company; differences in national corporate rescue laws make it difficult for different 
jurisdictions to cooperate with each other. It is here that PRFs can play a role in that they aim 
to avoid group-wide value-destruction insolvency without having to encounter the above-
mentioned difficulties.  
 The main purpose of PRFs is to preserve group going-concern value either by encouraging 
creditors to renegotiate their loan agreement so as to avoid group-wide insolvency122 or to sell 
the whole group to the newly formed companies owned by senior creditors at holding 
companies level. The recent debt restructuring cases below show that the rescue of MCGs does 
not necessarily involve all operating subsidiaries in varying Member States; in fact, group 
insolvency could be avoided by using PRFs. Debtors and senior creditors may exert 
considerable control and plan to decide how the distressed corporate group will be 
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restructured.123 A better way is to restructure debt at an early stage so that the group has more 
breathing space to devise a proposal without the constraints of traditional insolvency 
proceedings in different Member States. Such early-stage treatment may achieve a better chance 
of recovery.124 
 
3.3.1 Renegotiation of Debt Agreements at Holding Companies Level 
 
For the purpose of preserving group going-concern value, a useful way is to renegotiate the 
debt contracts. Where the debts of the groups of companies are mainly incurred at holding 
companies level, it is possible to avoid group insolvency by reaching a new agreement between 
debtor holding companies and their creditors. If one debt agreement includes a majority voting 
clause which allows certain debts to be modified without the approval of all relevant creditors, 
the hold-out issue will not be serious. However, in practice, only in complex leveraged loan 
agreements can one find such a clause.125 To facilitate reaching such a new agreement, certain 
legal tools with cram-down functions are necessary. 
 Schemes have the potential to deal with some debt restructurings involving cross-border 
groups of companies. When one group of companies encounters financial distress, the main 
task of the schemes is to facilitate parties to reach a new deal, for example, by extension of the 
maturity date of the debts.126 If the main borrower of the group is a holding company, the best 
way may be for a renegotiated deal to be made between the holding company and the senior 
creditors. The benefit is that there is no need to worry that multiple local insolvency proceedings 
are opened. The value of the group can be protected as the operating subsidiaries are not 
disturbed. For example, the new arrangement could include: issuing new shares to provide 
necessary funds for the group, conducting a debt-for-shares swap to settle part of the due claims, 
or converting the lower ranked debt to a higher ranked debt in exchange for an extension of 
debt maturity or waivers.127 Also, these schemes respect the expectation of those financial 
creditors as they may draft contracts before lending that prescribe how to control the business 
and how to distribute the value. 
 The Primacom Holding GmbH case128 exemplifies a vivid cram-down scheme case129 
where insolvency of an MCG can be avoided by using the UK scheme. In this case, the ultimate 
parent companies were two companies incorporated in Luxembourg. An intermediate company 
was Primacom which, along with its subsidiaries, operates mainly in Germany. In this case, 
most of the loan facilities were owed by Primacom, and the company could not serve its debts 
when they fell due. As a result, the company was of the opinion that debt restructuring could 
yield a better result than the German insolvency proceeding, so the company sought recourse 
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to UK schemes on the basis that its financial documents were governed by UK law.130 The 
scheme helped the company and its creditors to renegotiate debts.  
 The scheme provided new liquidity and deleveraged the group. Notably, debts of operating 
companies were novated to the holding company so that the German directors’ duty under 
German insolvency law requiring directors to file an insolvency petition when the company 
cannot pay the debt could be avoided.131 One important part of the deal was that Primacom’s 
parent company agreed to take on certain debts so that Primacom would not be forced into a 
German insolvency proceeding. The flexibility of the private restructuring solutions provided 
useful tools to support such planning and debt renegotiation. As a result, a potential cross-border 
insolvency of a group of companies could be resolved in only one jurisdiction. 
 The La Seda case132 is another example. The company La Seda, is the Spanish parent 
company in the group whose main business is packaging substance manufacturing across the 
EU. The scheme was used to amend senior debts governed by English law with a UK 
jurisdiction clause.133 La Seda was the borrower of senior facilities which were guaranteed and 
secured by most of the group members with their shares.134 The purpose of the restructuring 
was to inject new money into the group135 such that the group would not enter fragmented 
insolvency proceedings in Member States. As a result, the restructuring gave senior creditors 
more than 69% recovery, as opposed to insolvency which would have given senior creditors 
less than 40% recovery. The group used the UK scheme to cram down the dissident minority of 
senior creditors. The restructuring plan included, among other things, agreements which 
amended the terms of the senior loan facilities with senior creditors and added more group 
members as guarantors of the senior loan facilities.136 
 All these cases show that when debt contracts which cause the MCGs distress can be 
renegotiated, the group can be kept intact. As a result, it is likely that the group going-concern 
value is also preserved as the operating subsidiaries can be isolated in the restructuring process. 
Financial creditors may renegotiate contracts in accord with the terms of inter-creditor 
agreements. This provides certainty to them as well, as they accept the terms when deciding to 
lend money. However, this option is more likely to be available in concentrated syndicated loan 
cases. Therefore, one may not assume that all cross-border insolvency cases involving MCGs 
can be resolved in this way.  
 
3.3.2 Group Pre-Pack Sale 
 
Another way to preserve the going-concern value of a group is to conduct a pre-pack sale of the 
whole group to new companies formed by senior creditors of the group. In the sale, operating 
companies will still largely be intact, and junior creditors will bear most loss due to their ranking. 
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Inter-creditor agreements prescribe the priority and enforcement sale methods amongst 
financial creditors in an out-of-court fashion.137 Such a sale may happen at the intermediate 
holding companies’ level so that the group will ‘break the neck’ and transfer the main assets-
operating subsidiaries to the senior creditors. 
 In many cases, with the help of the contracts and restructuring laws, holding companies 
could sell the shares of all operating subsidiaries to senior creditors without the claims from 
junior creditors, provided that junior creditors have security and guarantee given by the 
operating subsidiaries. Taking the UK law as an example, the above-mentioned aim could be 
achieved by a transfer scheme and inter-creditor agreement. Transfer schemes allow shares or 
assets of the operating group to be sold to companies formed by senior creditors while leaving 
out-of-money creditors behind in the holding companies with little assets. Claims of junior 
creditors are released by the inter-creditor agreement so that they will not benefit from the assets 
of the newly formed companies.138 The aim of the transfer schemes is twofold: one is to cram 
down unsupportive senior creditors and the other is to allow the new company to be clear of 
debt of out-of-money creditors so as to avoid insolvency.139 
 The reason why the junior claims could be legally released is because of the inter-creditor 
agreement’s provisions whereby the priority and enforcement method of financial creditors are 
regulated; one example of the term is as follows:  
 
(a) the Junior Note-holders may not take any action to enforce their rights while the 
Senior Liabilities remain outstanding; 
(b) the Secured Parties have no independent power to enforce or have recourse to 
any of the Transaction Security, or to exercise any rights or powers with respect 
thereto, except through the Security Agent; […]140 
 
The fundamental result that an inter-creditor agreement would like to achieve is that the claims, 
guarantees and securities of junior creditors who, based on the evidence of valuation, have no 
economic interests in the corporate group, are released along with the security enforcement 
instructed by the senior creditors. As a result, the senior creditors could maximize the value of 
the corporate group as it is free of claims and encumbered assets from the junior creditors; it is 
not unusual that the terms of inter-creditor agreements put the right of control of enforcement 
in the hands of senior creditors by constraining junior creditors’ rights of enforcement.141 For 
example, in a European mezzanine inter-creditor agreement, the release provisions stipulate 
that junior creditors’ security and guarantee are automatically released if the senior creditors 
have instructed the agent to release their security on the debtor’s assets in accordance with the 
senior and second-lien facilities.142 That is to say that the debtor in the debt restructuring 
process could sell the whole group encumbered by the security and guarantee of all financial 
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creditors to the Newco formed by the senior creditors free of encumbrance.143 It has been 
expounded in Barclays Bank Plc v. HHY Luxembourg Sàrl144 that the operating subsidiaries 
could be sold to the senior creditors as a whole through a sale of shares in the holding companies, 
with all the guarantee and security on the assets of subsidiaries released on the basis of release 
provisions in the inter-creditor agreement between senior financial creditors and junior financial 
creditors. 
 The IMO Car Wash case145 is a good example of a pre-pack sale of an insolvent MNC. 
IMO is the world’s largest car wash company group based in the EU across fourteen countries. 
The group was funded by one senior facility agreement and one mezzanine facility agreement. 
When the group was in financial difficulties, it decided to transfer the business to Newcos 
owned by senior creditors with shares apportioned by them. Three of the main holding 
companies were put in administration to sell the business to the NewCos. The claims of the 
mezzanine creditors against the subsidiaries of the group were released by the security agent in 
accord with the inter-creditor agreement.146 As a consequence, the group was transferred to the 
senior creditors and the going-concern value was preserved. 
 The European Directories case 147  followed a similar path. The European Directories 
Group had business in nine EU Member States and used a pre-pack sale of one holding 
company’s shares in one intermediate holding company called DH 7. The fact of this case was 
that DH 6 and DH 7 were companies incorporated in the Netherlands. One intermediate holding 
company DH 6 owned shares of another intermediate DH 7 which, in turn, owned shares in the 
operating subsidiaries in the group. DH 6, the shareholder of DH7, sold the shares of DH 7. As 
a result, all operating subsidiaries in the insolvent MNC were sold to senior creditors. As the 
operating subsidiaries were kept intact, the group going-concern value was preserved. The inter-
creditor agreement allowed the junior claims to be released on enforcement action by senior 
creditors.148 
 
4. An Evaluation of PRFs in the Light of MCG Rescue 
 
4.1 The Nature of PRFs 
 
One essential feature of insolvency proceedings is that they are collective proceedings dealing 
with common pool issues (creditors taking individual actions) and anti-commons issues (hold-
out); insolvency proceedings generally impose a stay on creditors and provide a structured 
framework for all creditors to negotiate a reorganization plan in reorganization settings or an 
assets distribution plan in liquidation settings approved by the majority of creditors or 
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sanctioned by courts.149 To overcome those collective issues, insolvency laws are equipped 
with stay and cram-down mechanisms to facilitate creditors and debtors to arrive at a new rescue 
plan. In Sect. 2, it has been argued that in the corporate rescue spectrum, insolvency law and 
PRFs all aim to protect creditors by preserving the going-concern value of the debtors and by 
maximizing creditors’ recovery. Corporate rescue law can play an important role when 
financially distressed companies with going-concern value cannot be saved by a private 
workout and a ready sale in the market.150 Preventive restructuring procedures bring timing of 
rescue forward as otherwise it would be too late to preserve the going-concern value.151  
 Even though some PRF proceedings may not rely on an insolvency test, they all require a 
justification to modify creditors’ interests. For example, though US Chapter 11 can be initiated 
without an insolvency test, it requires a good-faith test whereby the necessity to use Chapter 11 
for reorganization or a business sale needs to be proven.152 The key rationale for initiating PRFs 
is that without their intervention, it is inevitable that the debtor will enter into insolvency.153 
 Since preventive restructuring procedures aim to achieve the general goals of traditional 
corporate rescue law and should apply in situations where insolvency of the distressed 
companies is foreseeable, they need the same tools to deal with collective issues such as 
commons and anti-commons.154 It is true that common pool issues arise in the vicinity of 
insolvency as creditors know that if they do not take active action to request payment, they may 
not be paid.155 Therefore, one may argue that preventive restructuring proceedings can be 
categorized as insolvency-related proceedings. 
 
4.2 The Relationship between PRFs and EIR Recast  
 
PRFs are designed to improve the effectiveness of national preventive restructuring procedures, 
with the intention to complement EIR recast.156 The EIR has extended its scope to incorporate 
pre-insolvency proceedings and hybrid proceedings and it seems safe to reason that the newly 
devised national preventive restructuring procedures should all fit into the scope of EIR 
recast.157 This is the basic relationship between PRFs and EIR recast. 
 What is worth noting is that Article 1 of EIR recast on the scope of the Regulation may in 
fact exclude certain preventive restructuring procedures from its ambit. To qualify as a 
procedure in EIR recast, some requirements must be met: the procedure should be public, 
collective, be based on the law relating to insolvency and have certain effects.158 
 The first condition for a preventive restructuring procedure to be able to be included in EIR 
recast is that it should be ‘public’ as opposed to ‘confidential’. The publicity requirement is said 
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to help ascertain claims and to allow creditors to challenge jurisdiction.159 Also, a certain 
degree of publicity enables creditors in other countries to be noticed and participate in the 
renegotiation.160 Schemes require publicity of the main provisions of debt restructuring plans, 
and key financial agreements need to be made available to the scheme creditors for checking.161  
 Collectivity, as opposed to individual creditors’ actions,162 reveals that the insolvency 
proceedings should aim to deal with issues for a majority of the stakeholders, while it does not 
mean that all the creditors of one debtor need to be involved if those who are left out are 
unaffected. 163  The Regulation provides that in many group cases it is possible that the 
proceeding only includes a significant part of creditors, i.e. financial creditors, provided that 
other creditors are unaffected.164 In many rescue cases of large MCGs, financial creditors at 
the holding companies’ level will offer to bear most of the losses of restructuring via schemes 
of arrangement if they are confident about the value and future of the distressed MCGs.165 This 
means that schemes of arrangement may only need to deal with financial creditors who are also 
the majority of creditors in terms of their value of claims in an MCG.166 The schemes have a 
collective nature in the sense that the court needs to consider the whole situation of the debtor 
and all creditors and the plan is binding on all creditors.167  
 Creditor schemes are insolvency-related procedures especially when they are used to 
conduct debt restructuring so as to avoid insolvency. 168  As mentioned above, preventive 
restructuring and traditional corporate rescue procedures aim to achieve the same goals.169 In 
the MCG rescue setting, the purpose of a creditor scheme, as a form of PRF, is to protect 
creditors by preserving the value of the group, which is one important purpose that insolvency 
law aims to achieve.  
 EIR recast prescribes a further requirement regarding an insolvency or preventive 
insolvency proceeding, i.e. that such a proceeding should be subject either to the control of an 
insolvency practitioner, or to the supervision of a court.170 In the case of creditor schemes, the 
English courts also need to ascertain that the proposed scheme is fair to all creditors.171 The 
compromise plan between debtors and creditors needs to be sanctioned by the courts.172 This 
requirement, though, increases cost due to the court involvement but also provides judicial 
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protection.173 Therefore, schemes of arrangement can be said to be under court supervision. 
 It seems that creditor schemes meet many of the requirements to be able to fall under EIR 
recast;174 nonetheless, the story has a twist. Recital 16 EIR explicitly prescribes that preventive 
restructuring procedures which fall under company law but not exclusively under insolvency 
law are outside the scope of the Regulation.175 Apparently, this will affect the status of schemes 
of arrangement as they come under company law and can be used for purposes other than debt 
restructurings.176 However, it may be just a matter of characterization and does not change the 
essence of creditor schemes. 
 Most importantly, a recent ECJ case has reflected the mainstream opinion on the boundaries 
of the scope of EIR. In Bank Handlowy, the court held that as long as a proceeding is listed in 
Annex A of EIR recast, it should be regarded as being within the scope of EIR recast and such 
effect is direct and binding. 177  As a result, since the UK government deliberately leaves 
schemes outside of EIR recast Annex A, creditor schemes are not preventive restructuring 
procedures.  
 It is true that some existing preventive restructuring procedures not fully meet the 
requirements of EIR recast but are still recognized by Member States simply because those 
procedures are listed in Annex A. What matters is not whether schemes of arrangement should 
be put in Annex A; what matters is what benefit Member State can receive by putting its 
preventive restructuring procedures with similar functions within the scope of EIR, especially 
for MCG rescue. This question will be examined in the next sections. 
 
4.3 PRFs and EIR Group Coordination Proceedings 
 
It has been recognized that ineffective insolvency law of some Member States adversely affects 
the restructuring of cross-border groups of companies.178 This article has shown that PRFs may 
supplement the existing MCG rescue solutions mentioned in Sect. 1 and improve the 
effectiveness of certain Member States’ insolvency law in preserving the value of MCGs.179 
The main goal that PRFs aim to achieve is to restructure financially distressed companies at an 
early stage and to avoid their insolvency.180 Without mechanisms to avoid insolvency, there 
will be no effective solutions if an MCG has entered into free-fall insolvency in multiple 
Member States. Due to differences in national restructuring law and insolvency law, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for courts and insolvency practitioners to cooperate with each other 
to preserve the value of a distressed MCG.  
 Nonetheless, the difficulties may be slightly eased by EIR recast. It introduces two 
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developments concerning MCG rescue: the obligations for courts and insolvency practitioners 
appointed in preventive restructuring proceedings or insolvency proceedings of different 
distressed companies in the same group to cooperate and communicate; a brand new group 
coordination proceeding. 181  EIR has made clear that it does not adopt a procedural or 
substantive consolidation approach to MCG rescue; rather, it takes a modest procedural 
cooperation approach by encouraging insolvency practitioners and courts of different 
companies in the same group to communicate and coordinate with each other. 182  The 
obligations of cooperation are imposed on the courts and insolvency practitioners in the opening 
insolvency proceedings, not including insolvency proceedings that have not yet been 
initiated.183 
 Chapter V of EIR recast is devoted to a group of companies; in its first part, besides general 
obligations for courts and insolvency practitioners to cooperate with each other, it grants three 
powers to insolvency practitioners to facilitate cooperation: 1) the right to be heard in foreign 
courts; 2) the right to request a stay and consider coordinated restructuring plans; 3) the right to 
apply for group coordination proceedings.184 Communication and cooperation can increase the 
flow of information exchange which is key to a successful restructuring at the pre-insolvency 
stage.185 
 In addition to the general requirements for cooperation and communication between 
insolvency practitioners and courts, Chapter V further specifically prescribes group 
coordination proceedings for MCGs.186 The key function of group coordination proceedings is 
to provide a platform for coordinators to consider a group coordination plan187 at an early 
stage188 and explore whether a better group-wide rescue option, be it extending debt maturity 
or selling group assets to repay debt, is available.189 Possible examples could be that the 
relevant group member companies which join the proceeding may decide to draft a coordinated 
recovery plan by extending debt maturity or selling group assets to repay debts.190 
 The coordinator in group coordination proceedings enjoys an enhanced power to impose a 
stay191 on insolvency or pre-insolvency proceedings of member companies, which can be used 
not only for a coordinated sale of the group assets enjoyed by the insolvency practitioners 
should the group coordination proceeding not be opened, but also for the rescue of 
companies.192 The stay power, to some degree, eases the ‘common pool issue’ especially when 
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a subsidiary aims to pursue a different goal.193  
 Companies belonging to the same MCG may not necessarily be registered (or have their 
CoMIs located) in the same Member State and be subject to only one set of insolvency rules.194 
Imagine if member companies are registered in more than one European country, the 
consequence will be that multiple preventive restructuring proceedings need to be opened. In 
the latter cases, PRFs and EIR group coordination proceedings may work together to avoid 
group-wide insolvency. Imagine a case where a group of financial creditors lends loans to two 
holding companies which in turn lend to their subsidiaries. It is possible for the subsidiaries 
group to push up the debts to the holding level so that two holding companies can conduct a 
debt-for-equity swap with the help of preventive restructuring procedures.195 The coordinated 
rescue plan facilitated by the group coordinator as mentioned above has a better chance to be 
successful due to better communication and coordination of insolvency practitioners and courts. 
Therefore, group-wide insolvency can be avoided by only putting two holding companies into 
preventive restructuring proceedings under the aegis of EIR recast.  
 More importantly, if the above preventive restructuring procedures are listed in Annex A of 
EIR recast, the possible stay imposed by the procedures and the legal effect of the swap plans 
will be automatically recognized by other Member States so that the creditors cannot take 
individual debt collection actions in other Member States and no other main proceedings against 
the same debtor can be opened in other Member States.196 
 Even though insolvency practitioners of one subsidiary in the same group can opt out from 
group coordination proceedings, 197  EIR recast imposes an obligation on the insolvency 
practitioners to consider the group rescue option at an early stage before considering opt-out.198 
Therefore, when two pre-insolvency proceedings are opened in two Member States, the 
insolvency practitioners and courts should work together to consider whether a group rescue 
option is available to all stakeholders at an early stage. The group coordination proceeding will 
provide a cooperative framework to achieve possible good results. The harmonized PRFs will 
also reduce the difficulties of coordination as they make national preventive restructuring 
procedures converge. As a result, the interaction between EIR and PRFs may increase the 
chances of preservation of the group going-concern value. 
 
4.4 Improved Commercial Certainty 
 
Since EIR Recast has extended its scope to include PRFs, rescue plans under the harmonized 
PRFs may enjoy the benefit of automatic recognition under EIR. That is to say, if one PRF is 
listed in Annex A of EIR recast, the possibility of rejection of a rescue plan under that PRF is 
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significantly reduced by other Member States.199 
 The PRFs will easily gain recognition by countries outside of the EU if those countries 
adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law.200 The UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency 
adopts a similar CoMI concept so that foreign courts only bear an obligation to recognize the 
main proceeding initiated in the jurisdiction where the CoMI is located, while the non-main 
proceeding can only get recognition with the discretion of foreign courts.201 As many MCGs 
may borrow the US high-yield bonds under US law, gaining the recognition of US courts is 
very important for MCG rescue. 
 By contrast, the English scheme gives rise to some uncertainty regarding its jurisdictional 
rules and difficulty of recognition. The jurisdiction test of schemes is the ‘sufficient connection 
test’ which is much easier to pass than the ‘CoMI test’ of insolvency proceedings regulated by 
EIR. English courts could claim the scheme jurisdiction of one foreign company irrespective of 
the fact that its CoMI and establishment are in another country as long as the sufficient 
connection test is met.202 In fact, the sufficient connection test is very favourable to English 
courts as in practice many loan contracts are dealt with by English law due to the UK’s powerful 
position in the EU financial area.203 
 The Van Gansewinkel Groep BV case204 is an example where the English courts decided 
to sanction the schemes for six foreign operating subsidiaries in the group. What puts this case 
in the spotlight is that none of these companies’ CoMIs or establishments are in the UK, whereas 
the only connection to the UK is the senior facility agreement governed by English law.205 The 
English court found a good reason, besides the sufficient connection test, to assume jurisdiction, 
i.e. that the home countries have no equivalent debt restructuring tools to prevent the MCG 
from entering into multiple value-destroying insolvency proceedings in different Member 
States. 206  In some cases, the MCGs may have no connections to the UK prior to debt 
restructurings.207 Sometimes, the sufficient connection was intentionally set up for the purpose 
of using the English schemes.208 In the Apcoa case, the governing law of credit contracts had 
been changed to English law so as to build up a sufficient connection to the UK. One key 
process of the restructuring was to extend the maturity of the debts borrowed by nine borrowers 
through schemes of arrangement in the group so as to avoid formal insolvency proceedings of 
the whole group. In this case, the UK court found a good reason to sanction the schemes, as 
without the schemes, there would be no alternative way for the corporate group to avoid group-
wide insolvency.  
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 English courts do not rubber stamp the schemes without sufficient connection,209 even if 
they can be beneficial to creditors and are supported by them.210 However, UK courts seem to 
be delighted to accommodate these foreign companies by using a low-threshold jurisdictional 
test even though some only have little connection to the UK.211 The broad jurisdiction may 
cause concerns about the recognition issue in the cases of the insolvency of foreign 
companies.212 English schemes falling outside EIR claim broad jurisdiction at the expense of 
automatic recognition.213 It is possible for dissident senior creditors who have different visions 
of the future of the distressed group to challenge the schemes in the countries with CoMIs of 
the companies.214 As a result, creditors may sometimes choose other insolvency proceedings 
or link schemes with other insolvency proceedings to ensure recognition by other Member 
States. For example, in the Schefenacker plc case, creditors chose a company voluntary 
arrangement (CVA) rather than schemes for fear of not being recognized by German courts.215 
 To mitigate the concern that schemes may not be recognized by foreign courts, foreign 
experts’ opinions are a very important element for the UK courts to make decisions.216 Such a 
case-by-case ad hoc approach may cause uncertainty and inconsistency. In addition, even if the 
English courts seize the jurisdiction, the complicated corporate structures of groups of 
companies and capital structures may stand in the way of recognition of schemes in other 
countries, especially the country of incorporation and CoMI.217 For the purpose of ensuring 
that the proposed schemes can be recognized, it is not uncommon for the companies to consider 
moving the CoMI or creating other connection points to the UK. All these moves create costs 
and uncertainty. 
 Without automatic recognition endowed by EIR, schemes should find other conduits for 
recognition. The most frequently mentioned alternatives are the Brussels I218 and Rome I 
Regulations.219 
 English courts are not entirely clear about how the schemes fall into the Brussels I 
Regulation and under what circumstances they are entitled to sanction foreign schemes.220 
What is clear is that the Brussels I Regulation clearly excludes its application to insolvency 
proceedings.221 As EIR and Brussels I are intended to dovetail with each other, if the creditor 
                                                             
209 In re Drax Holdings Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 1049, p 7, see also Re DAP Holding NV [2006] BCC 48. 
210 Milman (2016), pp 2-3. 
211 Ibid., pp 2-3. 
212 Omar (2014), p 6. 
213 McCormack (2014b), p 48. 
214 Perera and Mendiola (2015), p 4. 
215 Payne (2014), p 239. 
216 Ibid., p 313. 
217 Pilkington (2013), p 65. 
218 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I Regulation) [2012] OJ L 
351/1-32. 
219 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation) [2008] OJ L 177/6-16. 
220 Kortmann and Veder (2015), p 250. 
221 Art. 1(2)(b) Brussels I Regulation; Payne (2014), p 312. 
27 
 
schemes fall outside EIR, creditor schemes should fall under Brussels I.222 However, it is worth 
noting that EIR recast makes clear that procedures which are not in Annex A cannot be 
construed as automatically falling within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.223 
 Also, another restriction that prevents schemes from being recognized under the Brussels I 
Regulation is that the proceedings need to be adversary in nature, i.e. there should be plaintiffs 
and defendants involved.224 Nonetheless, PRFs are not adversary proceedings and the main 
purpose of PRFs is to avoid disputes between creditors and debtors and rescue the business.225 
Moreover, some mechanisms of PRFs including cram-down may have an effect on third parties 
so that they are not limited to a two-party relationship.  
 It is also not entirely clear whether schemes could be recognized under the Rome I 
Regulation. The Rome I Regulation is a set of private international rules applicable to 
contractual obligations. It allows parties to freely choose the contract law; the law of another 
country that has a closer connection to the contracts in question should also be respected.226 
 Applying Rome I as a basis to recognize English schemes presupposes that a creditor 
scheme is a contract. As a result, UK courts may only have jurisdiction to sanction creditor 
schemes if English law is chosen by creditors to regulate the loan contracts.227 Given their 
contractual nature, schemes should not cram down dissident parties to accept the 
compromises. 228  Moreover, distressed companies may have loan contracts which are not 
governed by English law, so the creditors governed by other countries’ law can ignore the 
consequence of the schemes but free-ride on the benefits gained from the compromise.229 
 Taking Brexit into account, the options to rely on EIR and other EU regulations to recognize 
creditor schemes may be significantly reduced.230 Therefore, it is better for other Member 
States to improve their own PRF versions. 
 Hence, the harmonized PRFs, by working with EIR, provide a better alignment of 
jurisdiction rules among EIR, Brussels I and Rome I and increase commercial certainty. PRFs 
also avoid unnecessary and costly forum shopping for English schemes simply because the 
home country has no equivalent PRFs. One may envisage that if other countries keep 
developing preventive insolvency proceedings, the English schemes may not be as popular as 
they are today for foreign companies.231  
 
4.5 Other Benefits Brought by PRFs 
 
The harmonization of PRFs may potentially bring the EU some other benefits due to the close 
relationship between restructuring law/insolvency law and economic growth. Insolvency law 
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supports economic development by allocating resources to the entities or persons who can use 
them in the most efficient way.232 Compared to other developed countries outside the EU, such 
as the US, inefficient insolvency law may also lead to a large volume of bank’s non-performing 
debts, high costs of cross-border insolvency, insolvency stigma, inability to save economically 
viable companies, and low economic growth rate.233 
 It is believed that the harmonized PRFs will contribute to a well-functioning pan-European 
equity and debt market by making corporate restructuring laws similar, easing the difficulty of 
assessing risks from different insolvency laws and attracting investment to the EU due to an 
improved debt recovery rate.234  
 Moreover, the harmonized PRFs improve free movement of capital. Given that some 
Member States are plagued by lacking PRFs or ineffective insolvency laws, such an undesirable 
situation restricts borrowers and lenders from advancing loans or buying shares; it also prevents 
free movement of capital in that one national law should not deter borrowing from foreign 
lenders or lending loans to borrowers from other Member States.235 Effective PRFs would 
provide creditors with maximum returns so as to the lower the interest rates of borrowing and 
incentivize more investment.236 This corresponds to the EU strategies calling for building a 





When an insolvent MCG enters the insolvent status, it is difficult to find effective rescue 
solutions due to obstacles created by differences in national insolvency laws and the 
organizational form of corporate groups. The European Commission’s proposal for a Directive 
on harmonized PRFs may provide a useful solution to avoid group-wide insolvency for 
creditors at an early stage. The proposal not only provides creditors with useful tools to 
overcome collective issues that insolvency law encounters, but also offers mechanisms such as 
early warning tools or Debtor-in-possession mechanism. These tools allow debtors and 
creditors to take timely actions. PRFs give creditors more time to plan debt restructurings with 
the debtor so that the financial issues may be solved in only one or a few jurisdictions. Also, 
the group coordination proceedings in EIR recast will enhance the efficacy of PRFs by 
providing a platform for cooperation and coordination if there is more than one preventive 
restructuring procedure opened in different EU Member States.  
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